Intervento di Rosario Sapienza, ex msacchino di Catania, oggi docente di diritto internazionale alla UniCT

Global Governance. An agenda.

1. I have been asked to say a few introductory words to our panel on the notion of Glo bal Gover nance. It’ s in some ways a dif fi cult task, because, to put it blun tly, the idea of glo bal gover nance is, in my opi nion, more an ambi tion than a reality. The terms “glo bal gover nance” in fact express the quite opti mi stic idea that it is pos si ble to deve lop rules and regu la tions on the same scale as the glo bal pro blems facing the world now. This does not howe ver imply the establishment of new institutions, though some may find it desi ra ble, but rather stres ses a point: that we need sets of new regu la tions, both public and pri­vate, which may offer bet ter oppor tu ni ties to meet the chal len ges of glo bal pro blems. To speak of a “glo bal gover nance” thus also implies the idea of a cri sis of gover nance at the natio nal level, the idea that sta tes or at least some sta tes, are no lon ger able to pro perly per form their regu la tory tasks, inclu ding in the eco no mic and social milieus, to cope with new pro­blems stem ming from glo ba li za tion. But it also invol ves, in some of its mani fe sta tions and approa ches (for exam ple in what is some ti mes cal led the glo bal free mar ket approach) the idea that inter na tio nal orga ni za tions, or at least those among them which are more tra di tio nal, more State cen tred or State … owned, are not able to cope ade qua tely with glo bal issues. The idea of glo bal gover nance is in fact cri ti cal of the State, both at the natio nal as at the inter go vern men tal level, because, in the spi rit of neo-liberalism, it asserts the supe rio rity of pri vate mana ge rial stra te gies on those enfor ced by governments.
2. Be that as it may, in a wide and sim ple defi ni tion, “glo bal gover nance” means the set of rules for orga ni zing human socie­ties across the globe. Now, I must confess that to me, as a law yer in the West, “glo bal gover nance” means above all the esta blish ment of an institu tio na li zed system of glo bal gover nance. And when I say insti tu tio na li zed, I do not mean only inter­go vern men tal, because I feel that the chal lenge of glo bal gover nance is now col lec ti vely to shape the destiny of the world by esta bli shing a system of regu la tion of these many inte rac tions that go beyond state action and that stem from the emer gence of some ele ments of a glo bal civic aware ness. In fact, a typi cal fea ture of the “glo bal gover nance” scheme is that a rapidly gro wing num ber of move ments and orga ni za tions sets the debate at the inter na tio nal or glo bal level. Despite its limi ta tions, this trend is obviou sly a logi cal response to the rise of glo bal gover nance issues. We are com pel led the re fore to con si der two dimen sions: that of inte gra tion and that of soli da rity. That’s why, although I know per fec tly well that there are pro blems of glo bal gover nance of the envi ron ment or the eco nomy, in my pre sen ta tion I will focus on insti tu tio nal and legal issues.
3. Now, if we aim at the con struc tion of a respon si ble glo bal gover nance so as to align the poli ti cal orga ni za tion of society to glo ba li za tion, we should work for a demo cra tic poli ti cal legi ti macy at all ter ri to rial levels (local, state, regio nal, glo bal). For this to hap pen, we must plan a com pre hen sive stra tegy of rethin king and refor ma tion, inclu ding at the same time:
• the vast majo rity of inter na tio nal orga ni za tions, lar gely inhe ri ted from the after math of the Second World War. They should change in a “system” of inter na tio nal agen cies with more resour ces and capa bi li ties, more fair and more democratic;
• the system of Sta tes, still based on a pre-Westphalian model. Sta tes must learn to share some of their sove rei gnty with insti tu tions and agen cies in other ter ri to rial sca les and at the same time all must under take major pro ces ses of dee pe ning demo cracy and orga ni za tio nal accoun ta bi lity. • the mea ning of sove rei gnty for citi zens. Peo ple must mat ter, but really! So we must rethink the mea ning of repre sen ta tion and poli ti cal par ti ci pa tion, and work towards radi cal change of vision, where citi zens may really feel that they con trol of the whole pro cess. We must seek for a new legi ti macy for those who are in charge. It is stri king, and defi ni tely unbea ra ble, that the most impor tant deci sions affec ting the glo bal eco nomy are taken today through unde mo cra tic pro ce du res and without any real legitimacy
4. But, in my opi nion, to achieve these goals we need a tho rough refor ma tion of inter na tio nal law and inter na tio nal rela tions. And, moreo ver, we must start by chan ging the way we think of them. But this, my friends, is easier said than done. In fact, even if we are in the era of the Uni ted Nations and inter na tio nal law has enor mou sly pro gres sed in the past two cen tu ries, Sta tes still behave as if they were in a pre-Westphalian Model of Inter na tio nal Relations.
This model is based on the accep tance by Sta tes of the idea of their sove reign equa lity, from which fol lows the need for a mutual respect atti tude bet ween them sel ves thought as equally sove reign legal enti ties. Before the Peace of West pha lia, a tra di tio nal star ting point for discus sions of inter na tio nal law, Sta tes abi ded by the so-called prin ci ple of non-intervention in inter nal affairs (and they still do). The con tent of this duty of absten tion was quite clearly defi ned. Inter na tio nal prac tice of the time shows a “cata lo gue” of situa tions in which Sta tes were expec ted to refrain from what was thought to be a for bid den inter ven tion in inter nal affairs of ano ther State. A first set of cases refer red to situa tions where a Sove reign requi red ano ther Sove reign to adopt, or refrain from adop ting, a cer tain beha viour while exer ci sing his power of govern ment. Even a sim ple request for cle mency for an indi vi dual sub ject to the sove reign power of the ter ri to rial Sove reign, was held to vio late the prin­ci ple and rejec ted on the grounds that the mat ter was purely inter nal and the re fore within the sole respon si bi lity of the ter ri­to rial Sove reign. A second set of hypo the ses of for bid den inter ven tion con cer ned cases where a foreign Sove reign trou bled the sove reign right to exclu sive exer cise of powers of govern ment of ano ther Sove reign by encou ra ging or fomen ting plots that distur bed order and peace in that State.
All these beha viours were inclu ded in the ban of “se mêler des affai res dome sti ques” (lite rally “inter fere in dome stic affairs”) and is easy to see that the ele ment they shared was just the fact of cau sing trou ble on the power of govern ment by the ter ri to rial Sovereign.
5. But why even just make a request for cle mency was to be con si de red inva sive of sove rei gnty? To under stand this, it should be noted that the admi ni stra tion of justice since the Middle Ages was con si de red to be the ulti mate mani fe sta tion of a sove reign power and, the re fore, ven tu ring to ask that an indi vi dual sub ject to the sove rei gnty of ano ther Sove reign should be trea ted in this or that way, amoun ted to acting as judge bet ween the Sove reign and his sub di tus, thus exer ci sing the sove reign power of adju di ca ting on the ter ri to rial Sove reign, repla cing him in the exer cise of this power that was con si de red essen tial to sove rei gnty, instead of lea ving the whole mat ter to his exclu sive power of appreciation.
6. Now, as we know, the true brea king point bet ween the medie val and the modern cul tu ral and insti tu tio nal hori zon is repre sen ted, with refe rence to this issue, by the accep tance of the rea lity of a plu ra lity of iuri sdic tio nes.
Middle Ages society, the Respu blica sub Deo, dee med the iuri sdic tio to be one and uni que, and seve ral strug gles oppo sed the Empe ror and the Pope con cer ning the exer cise and even the ulti mate foun da tion of that iuri sdic tio.
Modern inter na tio nal society is inter na tio nal (and, maybe, is modern) because it is a society in which dif fe rent Sta tes, all equally hold their own sphe res of iuri sdic tio to be sepa rate and distinct from that of other States.
But this is a point which requi res some fur ther con cep tual development.
First, we should bear in mind that what we have been say ing so far has its phi lo so phi cal and cul tu ral pre sup po si tions in the idea accor ding to which the Modern Age is no lon ger the era of a uni que Veri tas, but of the coe xi stence of dif fe rent auc to ri ta­tes, each with its own self-made and self-legitimizing veri tas.
Here is how you build the legi ti macy of the poli ti cal power of the sove reign State, which is sove reign pre ci sely because of its self-made and self-legitimizing veri tas.
It is no coin ci dence that our inve sti ga tion has star ted from the brea kup of the mono li thic or other wise rigidly hie rar chi cal con sti tu tion of the medie val world and its legal ratio na li za tion. We are spea king of the same period of the huma ni stic cri sis of clas si cal Aristotelian-Thomistic con struc tion that pro vi ded the para digm of uni ver sal kno w ledge and the re fore of uni ver sal justice.
The very idea of truth as a sole and uni que Veri tas enters an epo chal cri sis to give way to scep ti cism and a liber tine cul ture in the name of an abso lute free dom of the indi vi dual from any con straint. It ‘s the end of an hard idea of law based on a cer­tain idea of natu ral order and of divine command.
Now, if every sove reign State car ries its own self-made veri tas, the only way in which these dif fe rent and inde pen dent veri­ta tes can coe xist is to build an order that, far by the emer gence of its own veri tas, has the sole pur pose to pro mote coe xi­stence bet ween these auto no mous indi vi dua li ties. An order which is based not on a par ti cu lar veri tas, nor on the sole and uni que Veri tas but on a con ven tion, an agree ment on the idea that what Sta tes need is sim ply to co-exist, respec ting the right of eve ryone to build his own self-made veri tas.
Thus, the indi vi dual pleno jure sub ject of this “con ven tio nal” inter na tio nal order, i.e. the sove reign State, is the only owner of rights and then pro ceeds to set a “law without a State” that on first hypo the sis is based on a purely con ven tio nal idea, i.e. the neces sity of living toge ther, on the pro mo tion of peace because war is too destruc tive and the re fore unthin ka ble from the stand point of pre ser ving the system.
In addi tion, this sove reign State, and pre ci sely because it is sove reign, must reject the con struc tion of a genuine insti tu tio nal neu tra li za tion of oppo sing claims such as we could build (in a sch mit tian sense) by a “State of Sta tes” in the world.

Questo articolo è stato pubblicato il martedì, 22 marzo 2011 alle 10:38 am e classificato in Movi100notizie. È possibile seguire tutte le repliche a questo articolo tramite il feed RSS 2.0. Sia i commenti che i ping sono attualmente chiusi.